Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to Life by Antoine Bommier & Bertrand Villeneuve
CER-ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
Risk Aversion and the Value of Risk to Life
Antoine Bommier and Bertrand Villeneuve
Working Paper 10/133
September 2010







The standard literature on the value of life relies on Yaari’s (1965) model,
which includes an implicit assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life du-
ration. To overpass this limitation, we extend the theory to a simple variety of
preferences which are not necessarily additively separable. The enlargement we
propose is relevant for the evaluation of life-saving programs: current practice,
we estimate, puts too little weight on mortality risk reduction of the young.
Our correction exceeds in magnitude that introduced by the switch from the
notion of number of lives saved to the notion of years of life saved.
Keywords: Value of Statistical Life; Lifecycle Behavior; Cost-beneﬁt Anal-
ysis.
JEL: D61, D81, D91, I18, J17.
1 Introduction
Billions of dollars are spent every year on mortality reduction programs. Issues like
the allocation of funds to medical research or prevention, the design of safety rules
or the wording of environmental bills raise intense debate on the relevance of the
choices made by governments and their agencies. For economists, the baseline is that
alternative projects should be evaluated with objective criteria to avoid pure waste
or dramatic underinvestment in less popular issues.
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†Universit´ e Paris-Dauphine and CREST (Laboratoire de Finance Assurance)To back public decisions, some inquiry into individual valuation of life is indispens-
able. In practice, if we leave apart contingent valuation, the analysis of the wage-risk
tradeoﬀ is the major source of estimates of people’s behavior with respect to risk to
life. These surveys are primarily informative about industrial workers. Since public
programs aﬀect wider populations whose characteristics may vary considerably and
given that the mortality changes considered are often beyond the range experienced
by the reference sample, a theoretical support for the interpretation of the data is
indispensable.
The choice of the structural life-cycle model that minimizes bias at estimation and
extrapolation stages is capital. The standard approach uses additively separable life-
cycle models. The intertemporal additivity assumption, which involves an implicit
assumption of risk neutrality with respect to length of life is extremely constraining
(Bommier, 2006). Although this model has been severely criticized in other branches
of literature,1 it remains an almost universal assumption for applied theory papers
on the value of life.2
In this paper, we develop an alternative model, based on recursive von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions, which relaxes the additivity assumption and thereby
introduces what we shall call mortality risk aversion.3 Although this extension com-
plicates intermediate calculations, practical diﬃculties are kept at a reasonable level:
formulas for the value of statistical lives are almost as simple as those obtained with
the standard additive model. There are therefore no technical diﬃculties for apply-
ing this novel approach to concrete issues. Above all, relaxing additivity warrants a
signiﬁcant gain in accuracy. As a proof of concept, we use empirical results on the
wage-risk tradeoﬀ to calibrate both the additive and nonadditive models. While the
additive model proves unable to ﬁt the data, the generalization proposed provides an
1Even when mortality is not an issue, theoretical arguments underlined unpleasant consequences
of the additive separability assumption (e.g. Richard, 1975; Deaton, 1974 and 1992; Epstein and
Zin, 1991). Moreover, the additive model’s inability to ﬁt intertemporal choice has been repeat-
edly underlined by empirical studies (Hayashi, 1985; Muellbauer, 1988; Browning, 1991; Carrasco,
Labeaga and L´ opez-Salido, 2005).
2See for example the recent contributions of Murphy and Topel (2006) and Hall and Jones (2007).
3It should be clear that the nonadditive model we use introduces a variety of risk aversion towards
life length that is to be distinguished from ﬁnancial risk aversion as in Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2004)
and Kaplow (2005). These papers discuss the impact of the curvature of the instantaneous utility
function on the VSL. This issue matters particularly for understanding the income elasticity of the
VSL documented in Kaplow (2005).
2excellent ﬁt with reasonable estimated parameters.
To emphasize the importance of accounting for mortality risk aversion, we compare
the beneﬁts of (ﬁctitious) life saving policies using diﬀerent methods. The magnitude
of the bias caused by the additive separability assumption appears to be uncom-
fortably big. The type of cost-beneﬁt analysis that is currently recommended for
life-saving programs is likely to be strongly biased in favor of the elderly if the decline
of the VSL with age is underestimated. The correction we suggest could exceed in
magnitude that introduced by the switch from the notion of number of lives saved to
the notion of years of life saved.
The empirical wage-risk tradeoﬀ is used as a test of alternative theories of the
lifecycle preferences. Potentially, a better understanding of life-cycle behaviors would
be instructive for many applications not directly related to the value of life literature.
For example, this may to help to design contributions and beneﬁts in life insurance in
order to respond more adequately to individuals’ needs and thereby increase market
performance.
2 Related literature
Most of the economic literature on the Value of Statistical Life (henceforth VSL) is
based on a particular model whose standard version (e.g. Arthur, 1981; Shepard and
Zeckhauser, 1984; Rosen, 1988) relies on elements developed in Yaari (1965). Several
extensions have recently been suggested.
In Murphy and Topel (2006), health multiplies the instantaneous utility derived
from the ﬂow of consumption. Since health is assumed to be exogenous in the part
of their paper assessing the gain from mortality risk reduction, their approach is
equivalent to assuming that agents have additively separable utility functions whose
(exogenous) discount function is not necessarily exponential. Hall and Jones (2007)
also extend Yaari’s model by introducing a health component in the utility function.
Still, health being unobserved, they end up assuming in applications that it equals the
inverse of the mortality rate. Though sensible, this amounts to assuming that instan-
taneous utility depends on mortality through a particular functional form. Ehrlich
and Yin (2005) model a technology through which protection expenditures increase
3longevity; the authors also introduce a bequest motive.
The above contributions extended Yaari’s model in several directions, but have in
common that they all maintain the assumption of additive separability of preferences.
It is precisely that later assumption that we shall relax. Our contribution is thus of
a diﬀerent nature: instead of incorporating additional variables to Yaari’s model
(such as health or bequest), we explore the potential of a less straightly structured
speciﬁcation. As we shall see, this provides diﬀerent insights, especially on the speed
at which VSL may or may not decline with age at old ages.
The eﬀect of age on the VSL is controversial.4 Simple simulations of the original
models exhibit either a decline with age, or an inverse U-shape. When careful cali-
bration is achieved to match empirical consumption proﬁles, the inverse U-shape is
generally found, with a rather slow decline at old ages. The above mentioned theo-
retical extensions of Murphy and Topel (2006) and Ehrlich and Yin (2005) tend to
conﬁrm this prediction. Empirical works, however, do not converge to a consensus on
the relation between age and VSL. The hedonic regressions on wages in Aldy and Vis-
cusi (2003), Kniesner et al. (2006) and Viscusi and Aldy (2007) also show an inverse
U-shape relation between age and VSL, with a rather rapid decline of VSL at old
ages. Other recent works (Alberini et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2004; Aldy and Viscusi,
2008), based either on contingent valuation or wage-risk tradeoﬀs, tend to minimize
the signiﬁcant decline that was apparent in previous estimates. The debate seems
far from being closed. The present paper contributes to it by showing that when the
assumption of additive separability of preferences is relaxed in order to account for
mortality risk aversion, then a rapid decline of VSL at old ages becomes theoretically
plausible.
3 Lifetime preferences
3.1 Basic concepts and notation
Consider individuals of age a. We deﬁne a life as an inﬁnite consumption proﬁle c
and a (ﬁnite) age at death T. In life (c,T), c is a continuous function mapping the
4See the discussion in Aldy and Viscusi (2008) and the references to press articles therein.
4age interval [a,+∞[ into a(n unspeciﬁed) closed interval of R. Consumption at age t
is denoted by ct. Note that consumption is not a priori constrained to equal zero for
t > T; we just assume that individuals do not care for consumption after death.
Agents are assumed to be expected utility maximizers, and we denote Ua(c,T)
the utility associated to the life (c,T) as assessed at age a. Assuming that individuals
do not care for consumption after death amounts to posing Ua(c,T) = Ua(c0,T) for
any two c,c0 that are equal on [a,T]. This enables us to normalize Ua so as to have
Ua(c,a) = 0,∀c.












This time-consistent speciﬁcation ﬁrst appeared in the economic literature in Uzawa
(1969) in the case of immortal agents (with T replaced by inﬁnity). In the case of
agents whose life duration is ﬁnite with probability one, and with preferences deﬁned
over consumption and life duration, this recursive speciﬁcation was derived from
axioms covering a standard notion of stationarity in Bommier (2005).
Two special cases of the recursive model (1) must be highlighted. They are equally
simple and the empirical part of this paper will show a clear diﬀerence (in favor of
the second) in their abilities to ﬁt data.








where u is a well-behaved instantaneous utility function; λ is the subjective discount
factor. The additive speciﬁcation is by far the most popular in the economic literature.
It contains an assumption of risk neutrality with respect to life duration (Bommier,
2006), which may be too restrictive when one studies endogenous choices of mortality
risk and hence the value of life.
The second one is the multiplicative model in which v(c) = ku(c),∀c, for some












The term multiplicative refers to the fact that the exponentials of the instantaneous
utilities multiply each other. Being a concave transformation of an additive util-
ity function, this latter speciﬁcation maintains the assumption of weak separability of
preferences. Increasing k amounts to increasing risk aversion in the sense of Kihlstrom
and Mirman (1974). This speciﬁcation is therefore particularly appropriate to illus-
trate the impact of risk aversion on the value of risk to life.
3.2 Uncertain lifetime
Let’s consider now the case where lifetime is uncertain in order to model the tradeoﬀ
between mortality and consumption. A given consumption proﬁle c associated with





This expected utility will be simply denoted by EUa(c) in the rest of the paper,
when this cannot be a source of confusion. We shall assume that all the distribution
functions m(·) that we will consider along the paper are smooth with compact support.
To a distribution function m(T) corresponds the survival function
s
T





a probability of being alive at age T, conditional on being alive at age a and
the hazard rate of death µt =
m(t)
sT












Through a simple integration by parts, the expected utility EmUa(c) provided in (4)
























formula that we will take as starting point for most of our computations.
In order to guarantee that the above integral converges, we make two purely
technical assumptions.
Assumption 1 µt tends to inﬁnity as t tends to inﬁnity.
Assumption 2 c is bounded in the long run, i.e. there is an interval [cmin,cmax] with
cmin > 0 and cmax < +∞ on which c is supported after some arbitrary date.
This paper will not discuss the consequences, for given mortality, of recursive pref-
erences on the intertemporal allocation of wealth. Such aspects are indeed discussed in
Bommier (2005). We focus instead on issues related to endogenous mortality choices,
a typical example of which being the wage-risk tradeoﬀ.
4 The value of statistical lives
4.1 VSL
A natural concept to deal with choices involving mortality changes is the marginal
rate of substitution between mortality and consumption, or to get positive values its
opposite:










5Because of our continuous time modeling, we use Volterra derivatives. They measure utility
changes when consumption (or mortality) varies by an inﬁnitesimal value during an inﬁnitesimally
short lapse of time. For example ∂Ua
∂µt dµdt gives the change in Ua when mortality rates increase by
dµ during dt around t. A ﬁrst application of Volterra derivatives to economics is Ryder and Heal
(1973).
7An agent of age t is ready to give up VSL(c,t) · dµ · dt in consumption to save
dµ · dt statistical lives. This is how we construe the term “Value of Statistical Life”.
As discussed in Johansson (2002), various deﬁnitions of VSL have been suggested.
Another popular approach is to deﬁne VSL as being the opposite of the MRS between
mortality rate and wealth. Then VSL not only depends on individuals’ preferences but
also on intertemporal constraints. This latter approach coincides with ours whenever





The following expression relates VSL to survival probabilities and discount rates.


























The terms RD(c,t), MRA(c,t) and σt, are, respectively, the (mortality adjusted)
rate of time discounting, the mortality risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. They are formally deﬁned in Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the case of the recursive utility functions we consider, one gets:
RD(c,t) =







In the additive case, RD(c,t) = λ and MRA(c,t) = 0 so that with ct = c (a










This formula has been known for years and its simplicity explains its success. It is
considered very convenient since, if we abstract from consumption variations, VSL
8is proportional to a discounted sum of life years. The relation between age and
VSL is then computable from a standard life table and a discount rate. This way
of accounting for age was initially introduced by Moore and Viscusi (1988) and has
been used by agencies like the USA Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB) for cost-beneﬁt analyses even though
there remains an on-going debate about the interest of such an adjustment (EPA,
2000; Dockins et al., 2004; OMB, 1996 and 2003).
Proposition 1 shows that allowing for recursive preferences instead of focusing on
additive preferences is associated with a minor increase in complexity. Although the
generalization makes intermediate calculations more fastidious, we eventually ﬁnd
that the beneﬁt of saving one statistical life among individuals of a given age is also
proportional to the discounted sum of years at risk. Casually, we ﬁnd that accounting
for consumption variations is relatively simple, whether preferences are additive or
not.
Nonetheless, there are two notable diﬀerences between the additive and the re-
cursive models. First, in the recursive model the mortality adjusted rate of discount
RD is not constant. Instead of using a discount function e−λ(τ−t), as in the additive





. Actually, when we calibrate the model
(Section 5), we ﬁnd that the variations of RD remain limited until advanced ages, so
this ﬁrst diﬀerence can be considered as minor. The second diﬀerence is much more
signiﬁcant: years of life have to be discounted with the mortality adjusted rate of
discount (RD) minus mortality risk aversion (MRA).
Consequently, the greater mortality risk aversion, the faster VSL declines as a
function of age. This is fairly intuitive: a risk averse agent is willing to pay more
to avoid the chance of a major loss. In terms of mortality, a major loss would be
an early death. The additive model, which disregards mortality risk aversion, may
underestimate the speed at which VSL declines with age. The bias is estimated and
conﬁrmed in Section 5.
94.2 Wage-risk tradeoﬀ
The revealed preferences argument can be invoked to show how occupational choices
provide information about utility functions. Assume that, at all ages, an individual
has to choose between jobs that diﬀer with respect to wage and instantaneous fatality
risk. Labor income can be used for consumption or savings. Let µ0
t be the exogenous
baseline mortality rate at age t. For an extra instantaneous mortality µt (total mor-
tality being µ0
t +µt), the wage is denoted by w(t,µt). The marginal risk premium ∂w
∂µ
is denoted wµ.
Proposition 2 Under fairly general conditions, detailed in Appendix, the marginal














The observation of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ reveals VSL and makes the calibration
of the utility function possible. Compared to similar results, the strength of the
proposition is that it is established under quite general conditions that does not
require the existence of complete markets. In particular the results holds even if
individuals face borrowing constraints, which is often viewed as one of the main
reasons for which individuals have low consumption at young ages.
5 Data ﬁtting
5.1 Method
A hedonic regression ﬁts the envelope of the choices made by the workers in the sam-
ple (Viscusi and Aldy, 2003). Since the envelope is tangent to individual indiﬀerence
curves, the prediction based on the hedonic regression for a vector of individual char-
acteristics can be interpreted as the VSL for the corresponding worker. We base the
calculations on this fundamental observation.
Several recent contributions estimated the relation between age and VSL from
hedonic regressions and provided contrasting results (see discussion in Section 2). As
































Empirical estimates from Lee and Tuljapurkar
Smoothed profile used in the paper
Figure 1: Yearly individual consumption
an illustration, we use the result of one of them (Aldy and Viscusi, 2003, henceforth
A&V) to calibrate our model. By doing so, we do not claim to provide undisputable
estimates of the true preference parameters since they are conditional on the partic-
ular empirical age–VSL relationship we employ. Nevertheless, we comply with the
objective of the paper: showing that relaxing additivity parsimoniously can signiﬁ-
cantly improve the ability of the structural model to ﬁt the data.6 The consequences
for policy recommendations are far from trivial.
We use the parameters given by A&V in their Table 4:
w
AV
µ (t) = −1.92 × 10
7 + 1.88 × 10
6 t − 4.54 × 10
4 t
2 + 335.24 t
3 (16)
where t ∈ [18,62], expresses the individual’s age in years, and wµ the yearly wage in
1996 Dollars. The calibration strategy we pursue involves searching the parameters
of the recursive model that best ﬁt equation (16).
6Using one of the regressions in Aldy and Viscusi (2008) is an alternative. The qualitative results
they show are similar (inverted-U-shaped relationship between age and VSL with similar rates of
growth), but they suggest an overall higher level of the VSL. A consensus on the ideal database and
estimates is premature, and diﬀerent readers may have diﬀerent views, as we experienced.
11In order to calibrate the model, we also need the age-speciﬁc consumption proﬁle
c∗, which is not available in the dataset used by A&V. The optimal consumption
proﬁle cannot be deduced from the theoretical model without speciﬁcation of the
intertemporal budget constraints, on which we have limited knowledge. Rather than
posing speciﬁc constraints, we approximated c∗ with a smoothed version of the age
speciﬁc individual consumption proﬁle reported in Lee and Tuljapurkar (1997) (see
Figure 1 for the original estimates and the smoothed proﬁle that we use).7 As we use
consumption data from a diﬀerent source, we search the best ﬁt for the [20,60] age
interval instead of [18,62].
5.2 Goodness of ﬁt
The ﬁrst question that we may address is whether we can reproduce (16) with the
standard additive model (namely, v = λ = Constant and u(c) = c1−γ
1−γ − u0 for some
constants u0 and γ). The answer is positive, but with very implausible parameters.
Indeed the distance minimizing discount rate is −8.1%, which explains 94% of the
age-related variance in equation (16). Had we constrained the rate of discount to be
greater than or equal to 3% (to approach values that are considered as reasonable),
we would have at best explained 58% of the age-related variance.
At this point it is legitimate to wonder whether this poor ﬁt is due to the fact that
we only considered isoelastic instantaneous utility functions, or more fundamentally
to the additive separability. We relax each of these assumptions in turn.
If we simply require u to be increasing and concave rather than isoelastic, we can
obviously improve the ﬁt. By considering rates of discount greater than or equal to
3%, we can now explain 79% of the age-related variance. The gain in explanatory
power might seem signiﬁcant but, in fact, it is quite disappointing when we recall
that we added an inﬁnity of degrees of freedom to the model (u is now nonparamet-
ric). This control stage adds weight to our view that structure (additive/nonadditive)
matters much more that speciﬁcation (isoelastic/nonparametric), which we now il-
lustrate.
In fact, keeping u isoelastic but in the recursive form appears to be a much more




















































































Figure 2: Goodness of fit 
eﬃcient way to improve the predictive power of the model. We explored the case
where u(c) = c1−γ
1−γ − u0 and v = λ + βu; compared to the standard additive model
(β = 0), this structure requires only one additional degree of freedom. Moreover it
encompasses the multiplicative model (obtained when λ = 0) described in Subsection
3.1, which has the same number of degrees of freedom as the standard additive
model. In Figure 2, we report the minimum distance (the sum of squares) between
the theoretical predictions and the empirical estimates, the survival weighted average
RD being constrained to take particular values given on the horizontal axis. The
results obtained with the additive and the multiplicative models are also reported.
The distance on the vertical axis has been normalized so that the distance between
the empirical VSL and its mean equals 1.
Opting for the recursive model dramatically increases the capacity of the theory to
reproduce empirical VSL. Even if we constrain the mortality adjusted rate of discount
to take reasonable positive values we still obtain an excellent ﬁt. We can constrain the
survival-weighted average RD to take any value between 1 and 5%, and still explain
more than 96% of age-related variability of the wage-risk tradeoﬀ. This is much better
than the additive model which only explains from 49 to 66% thereof. Table 1 reports

























Empirical estimates from Aldy and Viscusi
Additive model, with RD=0.03
General model with average RD=0.03
Figure 3: Age dependent value of a statistical life
the model’s performance (variance explained and parameters) for a range of discount
factors. Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁts obtained when the average mortality adjusted
rate of discount is constrained to equal 3% in both models. Interestingly enough, one
can see from Table 1 or Figure 2 that when RD is constrained to plausible positive
values, the multiplicative model does a much better job than the additive one, with
the same number of degrees of freedom. Therefore even if one is reluctant to increase
the complexity of the model, a signiﬁcant gain is obtained.
Model Additive (β = 0) Recursive Multiplicative (λ = 0)
RD Average RD Average RD
1% 3% 5% 1% 3% 5% 1% 3% 5%
Var. explained 66% 58% 49% 97% 96% 96% 90% 95% 96%
b γ 0.72 0.22 0.0∗ 5.25 4.15 3.25 3.01 3.70 3.77
b λ 1% 3% 5% −0.12% −0.04% 0.07% 0 0 0
u0/(c
1−γ
1−γ )∗∗ -1.23 −7.51 −13.7 6.22 5.46 4.51 6.37 5.52 4.47
Average MRA 0 0 0 8.7% 8.9% 9.6% 5.2% 8.3% 10.4%
Average RDLY 1% 3% 5% 7.9% 8.4% 9.3% 5.1% 7.9% 9.7%
*Elasticity of substitution constrained to be non-negative. **c: (survival weighted) average consumption.
Table 1: Calibration and performance.
145.3 Evaluated parameters
For the recursive model, as apparent in Figure 2, the curve representing the distance
between predicted and actual values exhibits a ﬂat shape around the minimum; in
practice this means that the combination of parameters that optimally ﬁt the data
is diﬃcult to state. The observation of the relation between age and VSL may not
suﬃce to calibrate all the parameters of the model with precision.
This is not surprising given the theoretical results provided in Section 4. From
equation (11) we know that what matters for determining the variations of wµ along
the life cycle is mainly the combination of two elements: the mortality adjusted rate
of discount (RD) minus mortality risk aversion (MRA). If consumption were constant
along the life cycle, we would expect empirical observation of VSL to be informative
about the diﬀerence between RD and MRA, and not about each of them separately.
Though in our case consumption is not constant, which in principle should solve the
identiﬁcation problem, our estimates suﬀer from the same kind of indeterminacy. For
each value of RD we ﬁnd the best value of MRA, but it is hard to tell what is the
best pair of RD and MRA.
Ultimately, to discriminate more sharply between the several likely possibilities,
we should investigate data beyond the wage-risk tradeoﬀ. One possibility would be
to look at consumption smoothing behavior in order to estimate RD from another
source. Yet, our conclusions regarding the values of RD would be contingent on strong
assumptions regarding the credit market and its imperfections, whereas these are not
necessary for our analysis. Moreover, a single database that would be suﬃciently rich
to inform on both the wage-risk tradeoﬀ and consumption smoothing seems out of
reach. We preferred therefore to consider plausible range of values of RD rather than
trying to evaluate a single value. Results thereafter are systematically reported for
RD taking values 1, 3 and 5%.
The last raw of Table 1 provides the estimated values for the Rate of Discounting
for Life Years (RDLY), which is formally deﬁned in Appendix. This rate of discount
provides information on how people would be willing to trade oﬀ survival probabilities
at diﬀerent ages. This is a crucial element when estimating the welfare beneﬁts of
mortality risk reductions occurring at diﬀerent ages, as will be shown in Section 6.
155.4 Practical consequences
From the last two rows of Table 1, it is possible to get a ﬁrst idea about the bias
generated by the additive assumption. While the additive model constrains mortality
risk aversion to be absent, the recursive model gives estimates of MRA that range
from 8.7% to 9.6%. In other words, when people discount consumption with rates of
1, 3 and 5%, life years in VSL should be discounted with rates of −7.7%,−5.9% or
−4.6% respectively. The additive model, which imposes the same rate of discount for
consumption as for life years, is likely to cause a huge bias.
In order to tell whether this is likely to lead to a major shift in policy recommen-
dations, one may look at RDLY, which, as is explained below, is the rate of discount
to be used for estimating the welfare equivalent of a statistical life. While the additive
model constrains RDLY to equal the rate of discount, the more general model shows
values of RDLY that exceed those of RD by several percentage points. This means
that the additive model puts too much relative weight on mortality risk reduction at
old ages. Let us now explore how large the bias can be in practice.
6 Welfare evaluation
6.1 Objective
In order to evaluate the social beneﬁts of mortality risk reductions, a well deﬁned
social objective is required. The utilitarian approach axiomatized by Blackorby et
al. (1997) involves assuming that the social planner maximizes a stationary weighted







where the sum is taken over all individuals, λS is the social discount rate, bi is the
birth year of individual i and Ui
0 is his expected utility at birth.
We use Arthur’s (1981) terminology. The welfare equivalent of a statistical life for






16where c and µ are individual i’s consumption and mortality. WE has a fairly simple
















where RDLY is the rate of time disounting for life years whose formal deﬁnition is
provided in Appendix.
Like the VSL, the welfare equivalent is a discounted sum of life years. With the
additive model RDLY=RD, thus it is correct to use the discount rate inferred from
empirical studies on consumption smoothing to estimate the welfare equivalent of a
statistical life. With the recursive model, RDLY is typically greater than the rate
of time preferences estimated in studies on consumption smoothing. Thus, omission
of mortality risk aversion generates a pro-old age bias in the welfare evaluation of
mortality risk reduction.
6.2 Methods
We describe now the ﬁve evaluation methods for a program that we will compare in
the following subsection.
Method 1. The number of lives saved. Though there is no economic support
for this method, it has been frequently used. Actually, in their most recent guide-
lines, EPA and OMB still recommend to use an age-independent VSL for cost-beneﬁt
analyses. In absence of other source of heterogeneity, this involves quantifyng the
beneﬁts of reducing mortality by counting the number of lives saved, just as with this
method (Dockins et al., 2004; OMB, 2003).
Method 2. Utilitarianism with the additive utility function. The beneﬁt
of a program is measured by the social welfare function (17). Individuals are assumed
to have the same additive utility function, with a rate of time preference of 1, 3 and









a if τ ≥ t.
Diﬀerentiating (8) then gives (19).
175 %, the other parameters being drawn from Section 5. The social rate of discount is
taken equal to the individual rate of time preference.
Method 2’. Aggregate WTP with additive utility function. Assumptions on
individuals are the same as for method 2. The beneﬁt of a program is now evaluated
by the sum of the individuals’ willingness to pay for such a program.
Method 3. Utilitarianism with the recursive utility function. Similar to
method 2, with the recursive model as estimated in Section 5. The average survival
weighted RD and the social rate of discount are constrained to 1, 3 and 5%.
Method 3’. Aggregate WTP with the recursive utility function. Similar to
method 2’, with the recursive model as estimated in Section 5. The average survival
weighted RD and the social rate of discount are constrained to 1, 3 and 5%.
We could also deﬁne two additional methods that parallel methods 2 and 2’ but
make use of the multiplicative model. However, as it happens that the recursive
model estimated in Section 5 is practically multiplicative, the results are very close
to those obtained with methods 3 and 3’.
In principle, method 2’ (respectively 3’) amounts to method 2 (respectively 3) only
if one presumes that the marginal social value of consumption is equal across people
of diﬀerent ages; in other words, if redistribution is perfect. In practice, since the
distribution of wealth is far from ideal with respect to the social welfare function, it
has been argued that aggregate willingness to pay cannot be considered as a relevant
policy indicator. The issue is not speciﬁc to life saving programs but general to any
cost beneﬁt analysis (see for example the discussion in Blackorby and Donaldson,
1990). In the case of mortality reduction, Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) stressed
that because of the strong heterogeneity in mortality rates, aggregating individual
willingness to pay may actually be a particularly misleading indicator. More recently
Baker et al. (2008) discussed the possible justiﬁcations for relying on method 2’, which
they describe as “fairly restrictive”. Despite these shortcomings, method 2’ remains































































Figure 4: Distribution of lives saved


























To show the magnitude of distortion in the evaluation of safety programs, we consider
two ﬁctitious programs that are assumed to have the same cost. One that decreases
mortality rates proportionally and another that decreases mortality rates uniformly.
For example, we could think of air quality alerts9 on the one hand and of earthquake
surveillance on the other.
We denote these hypothetical interventions as A and B. Policy A is characterized
by a proportional reduction of mortality rates
µt → (1 − εA)µt, (20)
and policy B by a uniform reduction of mortality rates
µt → µt − εB. (21)
9Assuming a marginal impact of air pollution proportional to baseline mortality seems reasonable
to epidemiologists (Pope et al., 1995).
19where εA and εB are positive constants. We take the age structure of the population
and the baseline mortality rates observed in the USA in 1999. We also assume that
A saves twice as many (statistical) lives as B. Policy A is mostly eﬀective for older
people (and babies) while policy B saves lives uniformly. Figure 4 shows the age
distribution of lives saved (it has been scaled so that A saves 2000 statistical lives while
B saves only 1000). We assume that the consumption proﬁle is c∗ (see Subsection
5.1), for ages above 20. For ages below 20, and especially for babies and children, the
assumption that preferences are independent of age becomes problematic. The low
levels of consumption that are typically observed in the very ﬁrst years of life would
then imply very high marginal utility of consumption, and therefore very low values
of statistical lives. This is hard to buy. To circumvent this diﬃculty, we maintain the
assumption that preferences are independent of age and assume that consumption is
the same between birth and 20. Of course this option is arbitrary, one of its merits
being that most of the diﬀerence between A and B is based on eﬀects on the adults,
for which estimates are more reliable.
Intuitively, it is not very clear whether A or B should be preferred. On the one
hand A saves more lives. On the other hand B saves younger people, who still have
many years of life before them. We use the above ﬁve types of beneﬁt evaluation.
The results are summarized in Table 2. By assumption, A is twice as eﬃcient as
B from the viewpoint of method 1. The additive model in methods 2 and 2’ provides
an age-adjusted value of a statistical life, so the conclusion is diﬀerent. Methods 2
and 2’ predict that the beneﬁts of A and B are of about the same size. The fact
that B saves less lives than A is approximately compensated by the fact that it saves
younger people. The question now is whether this age adjustment and this conclusion
are correct. Methods 3 and 3’ suggest that they are not. With the recursive model,
the beneﬁts of B appear to be much greater than those of A. The correction related
to the introduction of mortality risk aversion is anything but negligible. Passing from
the additive model to the nonadditive one is a bigger step than passing from the
traditional method (number of lives saved) to the additive model.
20Discount rate
Method for beneﬁt evaluation 1% 3% 5%
1. Number of lives saved 0.5 0.5 0.5
2. Utilitarianism with additive utility 1.34 1.11 0.97
3. Utilitarianism with recursive utility 3.88 3.23 2.64
2’. Aggregate WTP with additive utility 1.18 1.06 0.97
3’. Aggregate WTP with recursive utility 1.72 1.95 1.75
Table 2: Beneﬁts of B/Beneﬁts of A.
EPA guidelines advise performing sensitivity analysis by calculating the results
of both methods 1 and 2’. As the results of method 2’ are known to depend on the
rate of discount, about which there is no general agreement, they advise reporting the
results for diﬀerent rates. We report results for rate of dicounts lying in the 1–5 %
interval, which is generally considered as providing a reasonable conﬁdence interval.
Unfortunately, the additive model is so restrictive that the truth may be way outside
this interval. The methods currently used by EPA and OMB (and indirectly by
policymakers) are likely to be signiﬁcantly distorted in favor of the old.
7 Conclusion
Most economists would agree that predicting saving behavior under the assumption
of risk neutrality would make little sense. They would also vehemently criticize a fund
manager who decides to “optimize” investment under the assumption that members
are risk neutral.
However, the economic literature on the value of a statistical life has endorsed a
similar choice. It focused on a speciﬁcation that paid little attention to the fact that
mortality makes our life akin to an extraordinary lottery. Is it reasonable to assume
that individuals are risk neutral with respect to length of life? And to evaluate life
saving programs under this assumption?
These questions have been addressed in this paper. On the theoretical side, the
story is clear. Mortality risk aversion makes individual willingness to pay for mortal-
ity risk reduction decline more rapidly with age. Although intermediate calculations
are sometimes fastidious, we eventually found that accounting for mortality risk aver-
21sion is fairly simple. Just like with the standard additive model, estimating VSL
and welfare beneﬁts associated to mortality risk reduction simply involves computing
weighted sums of life-years saved. The rates of discount to be used must however
account for both time preferences and mortality risk aversion.
The key issue is therefore to estimate mortality risk aversion. The diﬃculty of the
task should not be underestimated. Since Arrow’s (1971) and Pratt’s (1964) seminal
contributions, about 40 years have passed and a number of empirical studies tried to
measure risk aversion with respect to lotteries on wealth. No consensus has emerged.
There is no reason to believe that preferences with respect to lotteries on the length
of life will be easier to assess. It would be excessively optimistic to expect that a
single study could provide a robust estimate of mortality risk aversion. This should
be rather seen as a long term objective that will probably require the collection of
speciﬁc data.
However, in order to clarify the ideas at stake, we used results from a recent
empirical study on the relation between VSL and age to estimate plausible values of
mortality risk aversion. The theoretical extension neatly improved the quality of ﬁt.
We found that this index of risk aversion is likely to be positive and greater than the
rate of time discounting. In other words, accounting for mortality risk aversion may
even be more important than accounting for time preferences.
The contrast between our ﬁndings and the dominant economic approach is strik-
ing. While the notion of time preferences has been pointed out as being a critical
element to estimate the value of a statistical life, the standard method simply rules
out mortality risk aversion. It seems that “the paradigm of optimizing a simple func-
tional form” (to take Rubinstein’s 2003 words) has led economists to ignore a key
ingredient of individual preferences. The consequence is that cost-beneﬁt analysis
produced for the allocation of public money across life saving programs is likely to be
strongly distorted.
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26A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Deﬁnitions and properties
Along the paper we make use of recursive utility functions which implies that agents’














As we depart from the additive case recalled below, the meanings of u and v are not
straightforward and it is no longer immediate to relate these functions to properties
that could be inferred from empirical observation. It is for example incorrect to
interpret the integral
R t
a v(cτ)dτ as an “accumulated rate of time preference”, as was
done in Uzawa (1969). The rate of time discounting is a well deﬁned marginalist
concept that can be deﬁned independently of the structure of the utility function,
as in Epstein (1987) and which needs to be computed with the general recursive
speciﬁcation. In presence of mortality it is however useful to adjust the deﬁnition as
follows:

















In absence of mortality at age t (i.e. if st
a were constant around t), RD(c,t) would
correspond to the standard deﬁnition of rate of time discounting in continuous time.
The correction 1/st
a simply neutralizes the uncertainty eﬀect that mortality risk has
on consumption (consumption is contingent on survival).
With the recursive model, calculations yield
RD(c,t) =
v(ct)u0(ct) − v0(ct)(u(ct) − µtEUt)
u0(ct) − v0(ct)EUt
, (24)
where EUt is deﬁned in (8). Note that although the deﬁnition of RD(c,t) is condi-
tional on a, the current age of the individual, RD(c,t) only depends on consumption
and mortality at ages greater than or equal to t, a natural consequence of the re-
27cursive structure of the utility functions. Remark also that with additive utilities,
that is when v(·) = λ, this equation simpliﬁes to RD=λ which is consistent with the
fact that the parameter λ is generally introduced as the “rate of time preference”
in studies that used the additive speciﬁcation. But in the more general recursive
setting the rate of time discounting, which is a key element when looking at optimal
consumption smoothing, is endogenous and has a complex expression.
A similar complication occurs when looking at the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution, another key determinant of the marginal trade-oﬀs involved in consumption
smoothing. In continuous time the intertemporal elasticity of substitution can be de-
ﬁned as the limit of the direct elasticity of substitution (as deﬁned in McFadden, 1963)
between consumptions at two diﬀerent dates whose time distance tends to zero.
Deﬁnition 3 (IES) The intertemporal elasticity of substitution at age t, which we



































where δt is the Dirac delta function.10







When preferences are additive or multiplicative, this formula simpliﬁes to σt =
−u0(ct)
ctu00(ct).
Another interesting concept of time discounting simply expresses how people are
willing to trade oﬀ survival probabilities at diﬀerent ages.
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ct=0
. (27)
10The presence of the Dirac delta function is a purely technical point related to continuous time
modeling. This function appears when second order derivatives are involved. See also footnote 5.
28With the recursive model,
RDLY(c,t) = v(ct). (28)
Finally we introduce a new concept, which is at the center of our analysis, and
requires more comments and clariﬁcations.














This coeﬃcient is unaﬀected by an aﬃne transformation of Ua, meaning that
it represents a fundamental characteristic of individual preferences, independent of
the speciﬁc representation that was chosen. If the marginal utility of life extension is
decreasing in past consumption (that is if
∂2Ua(c,T)
∂ct∂T < 0 for all T > t) then MRA(c,t) ≥
0.
The terminology “mortality risk aversion” emphasizes that MRA(c,t) corresponds
to a coeﬃcient of risk aversion with respect to length duration along particular (and


































The ﬁrst term in the RHS is recognizable as a coeﬃcient of risk aversion with respect













are considered, MRA(c,t) and the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient are equal.
Consumption proﬁles that comply with (32) are characterized by the fact that
the marginal rate of substitution between additional life years and consumption just
before death is independent of the age at death. In particular, (32) amounts to having
29u(ct)e−λt constant in the additive model, and ct is constant with the multiplicative
model. In both cases, this can be interpreted as having a constant ﬂow of felicity
(Bommier, 2006).
The decomposition into two terms is important for understanding the origin of
MRA(c,t), but quite remarkably, with the recursive model any consumption proﬁle





which depends only on consumption at time t. Remark that MRA(c,t) > (<)0 if v(·)
is increasing (decreasing) and is null with theadditive model.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In the proof, VSL stands for VSL(c,t) and RD for RD(c,t). We start from (10) and
we use the fact that
dEUt
dt














(µt + v(ct))EUt − u(ct)
u0(ct) − v0(ct)EUt
.
Using (24) and (26), we get
d
dt






























30Combining (38) with (36) yields
d
dt


































































Step 1. It is easy to see that the RHS of (41), if it converges, is a solution to the
ODE (40).
Step 2. Remark that EUt > 0. Indeed, a natural assumption is that the marginal
value of life years, which is proportional to u, is positive, and u > 0 implies EUt > 0.
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, EUt tends to zero as t tends to inﬁnity. This and (10)
imply that VSL→ 0 as t → +∞. We can also conclude from this, (24) and EUt > 0,
that RD is bounded below in the long run. Consequently, ρ(c,t) → +∞ as t → +∞.
This implies that the RHS of (41)→ 0 as t → +∞. VSL and the RHS of (41) have
therefore the same limit when t → +∞.
Step 3. The ODE (40) being linear, if we denote by y the diﬀerence between the
VSL and the RHS of (41), we have
y
0 = ρ(c,t)y. (43)
Given that ρ(c,t) → +∞ as t → +∞, y goes to inﬁnity when t → +∞ if it’s not
null. This fact, combined with the result on limits (step 2), proves that (41) is true.
31B Proof of Proposition 2
We denote by k = (kt)t≥0 the age-speciﬁc saving proﬁle deﬁned by
kt ≡ w(t,µt) − ct. (44)
For our purpose, we do not need to fully specify the lifetime budget constraints that
are related to the intertemporal markets and their possible imperfections. We will
simply assume that these constraints (possibly inﬁnitely many) only bear on the
function k and that each of them is Volterra diﬀerentiable. We denote the set of
constraints by K.
We may think of diﬀerent kinds of constraints. With non storable commodities
and no intertemporal markets, kt = 0 for all t. Another possibility would be a single
constraint of the form
R ∞
0 kthte−rtdt = 0 with r being the rate of interest and h =
(ht)t≥0 an exogenous function. This includes the important case of intertemporal
markets, in particular life annuities.11 We could also imagine that the constraints K
have the form
R t
0 kτe−rτdτ ≥ 0 for all t. That would be the case in a world where
there is no annuity market, no borrowing and a rate of return on savings equal to r.
More complex market imperfections can be thought of. Undoubtedly, allowing any
kind of constraints on k leaves us with a fairly high degree of generality, although
certain cases are not covered (e.g. nonlinear consumption taxes).














A rational agent solves the maximization program
max
µ,c EUa(c,µ) s.t. K. (46)
The derivative wµ(t,µ) =
∂w(t,µ)
∂µ is the “wage-risk tradeoﬀ.” Even without an
11 To be more speciﬁc, exogenously priced life annuities are considered. Endogenous prices would
mean that prices change as the consumer changes his mortality e.g. via activity choice. This case is
not included here; if h were equal to the (endogenous) survival function, as with perfect intertemporal
markets, the VSL at age a would be reduced by the wealth held at age a. Quantitatively speaking,
the correction is minor (average wealth is typically much lower than the VSL).
32explicit formulation of the constraints K, we can show that at the optimal choice the








kτ = 0. (47)
Let c∗ and µ∗ denote the optimal consumption and mortality paths. As we assumed
that all constraints can be written as functions of k, the ﬁrst order conditions ensure
that for all t, utility cannot be improved without violating the constraints. Thus,






















































Empirical estimates from Lee and Tuljapurkar
Smoothed profile used in the paper











































































































Empirical estimates from Aldy and Viscusi
Additive model, with RD=0.03
General model with average RD=0.03





























































Figure 4: Distribution of lives saved
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